Technical Program
| Day 1 (November 4) | |
|---|---|
| Time | Activities |
| 08:30 - 09:25 | Breakfast & Registration |
| 09:25 - 09:30 | Opening Remarks |
| 09:30 - 10:30 | Plenary Speaker: Professor Eitan Altman |
| 10:30 - 10:45 | Break |
| 10:45 - 12:15 | Network Security |
| 12:15 - 13:45 | Lunch |
| 13:45 - 15:45 | Security of Competitive Environments |
| 15:45 - 16:15 | Break |
| 16:15 - 17:45 | Short Papers |
| Day 2 (November 5) | ||
|---|---|---|
| Time | Activities | |
| 08:30 - 09:30 | Breakfast & Registration | |
| 09:30 - 10:30 | Plenary Speaker: Professor Chris Hankin | |
| 10:30 - 10:45 | Break | |
| 10:45 - 12:15 | Learning and Behavioral Models for Security | |
| 12:15 - 13:45 | Lunch | |
| 13:45 - 15:45 | Decision-Making for Security and Privacy | |
| 15:45 - 16:15 | Break | |
| 16:15 - 17:15 | Cloud Security | |
Day 1 (November 4)
| 08:30 - 09:25 Breakfast & Registration |
|---|
| 09:25 - 09:30 Opening Remarks |
|---|
| 09:30 - 10:30 Plenary Speaker: Professor Eitan Altman |
|---|
| Game theory applied to Protection against SIS Epidemics in Networks Defining an optimal protection strategy against viruses, spam propagation or any other kind of contamination process is an important feature for designing new networks and architectures. In this work, we consider decentralized optimal protection strategies when a virus is propagating over a network through a SIS epidemic process. We assume that each node in the network can fully protect itself from infection at a constant cost, or the node can use recovery software, once it is infected. We model our system using a congestion game theoretic framework (due to Rosenthal) and find pure, mixed equilibria, and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) in several network topologies. We finally propose extensions of both the SIS propagation model as well as of the protection strategies and evaluate their performance. This work was done within the CONGAS European project on games in complex systems with the authors Stojan Trajanovski, Yezekael Hayel, Huijuan Wang and Piet Van Mieghem. |
| 10:30 - 10:45 Break |
|---|
| 10:45 - 12:15 Network Security |
|---|
| A Game-Theoretic Approach to IP Address Randomization in Decoy-Based Cyber
Defense Andrew Clark, Kun Sun, Linda Bushnell and Radha Poovendran |
| Attack-Aware Cyber Insurance for Risk Sharing in Computer Networks Yezekael Hayel and Quanyan Zhu |
| Beware the Soothsayer: From Attack Prediction Accuracy to Predictive Reliability in
Security Games Benjamin Ford, Thanh Nguyen, Milind Tambe, Nicole Sintov and Francesco Delle Fave |
| 12:15 - 13:45 Lunch |
|---|
| 13:45 - 15:45 Security of Competitive Environments |
|---|
| Games of Timing for Security in Dynamic Environments Benjamin Johnson, Aron Laszka and Jens Grossklags |
| Threshold FlipThem: When the winner does not need to take all David Leslie, Chris Sherfield and Nigel Smart |
| A Game Theoretic Model for Defending Against Stealthy Attacks with Limited Resources Ming Zhang, Zizhan Zheng and Ness B. Shroff |
| Passivity-Based Distributed Strategies for Stochastic Stackelberg Security
Games Phillip Lee, Andrew Clark, Basel Alomair, Linda Bushnell and Radha Poovendran |
| 15:45 - 16:15 Break |
|---|
| 16:15 - 17:45 Short papers |
|---|
| Genetic Approximations for the Failure-Free Security Games Aleksandr Lenin, Jan Willemson and Anton Charnamord |
| To Trust or Not: A Security Signaling Game between Service Provider and Client Monireh Mohebbi Moghadam, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei and Quanyan Zhu |
| Game Theory and Security: Recent History and Future Directions Jonathan Merlevede and Tom Holvoet |
| Uncertainty in Games: Using Probability-Distributions as Payoffs Stefan Rass, Sandra Koenig and Stefan Schauer |
| Incentive Schemes For Privacy-Sensitive Consumers Chong Huang, Lalitha Sankar and Anand Sarwate |
Day 2 (November 5)
| 08:30 - 09:30 Breakfast & Registration |
|---|
| 09:30 - 10:30 Plenary Speaker: Professor Chris Hankin |
|---|
| Games and Cyber Security Investment
When investing in cyber security resources, information security managers have to follow effective decision-making strategies. We have investigated a number of methodologies to address this challenge from pure game theory through to a hybrid approach using classical optimisation techniques with game theory. We have constructed tools to support this work and conducted a major case study. The lecture will report on our latest findings from this work. |
| 10:30 - 10:45 Break |
|---|
| 10:45 - 12:15 Learning and Behavioral Models for Security |
|---|
| Combining Online Learning and Equilibrium Computation in Security Games Richard Klíma, Viliam Lisy and Christopher Kiekintveld |
| Interdependent Security Games under Behavioral Probability Weighting Ashish Hota and Shreyas Sundaram |
| Making the most of Our Regrets: Regret-based Solutions to Handle Payoff Uncertainty and
Elicitation in Green Security Games Thanh Nguyen, Francesco Maria Delle Fave, Debarun Kar, Aravind Srinivas Lakshminarayanan, Amulya Yadav, Milind Tambe, Noa Agmon, Andrew J. Plumptre, Margaret Driciru, Fred Wanyama and Aggrey Rwetsiba |
| 12:15 - 13:45 Lunch |
|---|
| 13:45 - 15:45 Decision-Making for Security and Privacy |
|---|
| A Security Game Model for Environment Protection in the Presence of an Alarm
System Nicola Basilico, Giuseppe De Nittis and Nicola Gatti |
| Determining a Discrete Set of Site-Constrained Privacy Options for Users in Social
Networks through Stackelberg Games Sarah Rajtmajer, Christopher Griffin and Anna Squicciarini |
| Approximate Solutions for Attack Graph Games with Imperfect Information Karel Durkota, Viliam Lisy, Branislav Bosansky and Christopher Kiekintveld |
| When the Winning Move is Not to Play: Games of Deterrence in Cyber Security Chad Heitzenrater, Greg Taylor and Andrew Simpson |
| 15:45 - 16:15 Break |
|---|
| 16:15 - 17:15 Cloud security |
|---|
| Sequentially Composable Rational Proofs Matteo Campanelli and Rosario Gennaro |
| Flip the Cloud: Cyber-Physical Signaling Games in the Presence of Advanced Persistent
Threats Jeffrey Pawlick, Sadegh Farhang and Quanyan Zhu |
*The time slot for each full paper presentation will be 25 min + 5 min discussion, and for each short paper will be 15 min + 5 min discussion.