GameSec 2016

Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security

November 2-4, 2016, New York, NY, USA

Detailed Program

Click here for the detailed program in pdf. The program is also listed below.


Plenary Speaker 1: George Cybenko


Photo: G Cybenko

Speaker Biosketch

George Cybenko is the Dorothy and Walter Gramm Professor of Engineering at Dartmouth. Professor Cybenko has made research contributions in signal processing, neural computing, parallel computing and computational behavioral analysis. He was the Founding Editor-in-Chief of IEEE/AIP Computing in Science and Engineering and IEEE Security & Privacy. He recently started IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems as founding EIC. He has served on the Defense Science Board (2008-2009), US Air Force Scientific Advisory Board and on review and advisory panels for DARPA, IDA/CCS, NSA, BAE Systems and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Professor Cybenko is a Fellow of the IEEE, received the 2016 SPIE Eric A. Lehrfeld Award for "outstanding contributions to global homeland security" and the US Air Force Commander's Public Service Award. He obtained his BS (Toronto) and PhD (Princeton) degrees in Mathematics. He has held visiting appointments at MIT, Stanford and Leiden University where we has the Kloosterman Visiting Distinguished Professor. Cybenko is co-founder of Flowtraq Inc, which focuses on commercial software and services for large-scale network flow security and analytics.

Talk Title: The Future of Game Theory in Security

Abstract: Security is most definitely an adversarial engagement and so fits under the broad umbrella of situations that can be modeled by game theory. This talk will discuss three types of applications of game theory to real world security problems - forensic, conceptual and prescriptive. After presenting examples of each together with their relative successes and shortcomings, a variety of possible future roles for game theory in security will be proposed and dissected. Audience discussion and participation will be highly encouraged.

Plenary Speaker 2: Anna Nagurney


Photo: A Nagurney

Speaker Biosketch

Anna Nagurney is the John F. Smith Memorial Professor at the Isenberg School of Management at the University of Massachusetts Amherst and the Director of the Virtual Center for Supernetworks, which she founded in 2001. She holds ScB, AB, ScM and PhD degrees from Brown University in Providence, RI. She is the author of 12 books, more than 175 refereed journal articles, and over 50 book chapters. She presently serves on the editorial boards of a dozen journals and two book series and is the editor of another book series. Professor Nagurney has been a Fulbrighter twice (in Austria and Italy), was a Visiting Professor at the School of Business, Economics and Law at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden for the past 4 years and was a Distinguished Guest Visiting Professor at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) in Stockholm. She was a Visiting Fellow at All Souls College at Oxford University during the 2016 Trinity Term. Anna has held visiting appointments at MIT and at Brown University and was a Science Fellow at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard University in 2005-2006. She has been recognized for her research on networks with the Kempe prize from the University of Umea, the Faculty Award for Women from the US National Science Foundation, the University Medal from the University of Catania in Italy, and was elected a Fellow of the RSAI (Regional Science Association International) as well as INFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences) among other awards.

Anna's research focuses on network systems from transportation and logistical ones, including supply chains, to financial, economic, social networks and their integration, along with the Internet. She studies and models complex behaviors on networks with a goal towards providing frameworks and tools for understanding their structure, performance, security, and resilience and has contributed also to the understanding of the Braess paradox in transportation networks and the Internet. She has advanced methodological tools used in game theory, network theory, equilibrium analysis, and dynamical systems. She was a Co-PI on a multi-university NSF grant with UMass Amherst as the lead: Network Innovation Through Choice, which was part of the Future Internet Architecture (FIA) program and is presently a Co-PI on an NSF EAGER grant: Enabling Economic Policies in Software-Defined Internet Exchange Points.

Talk Title: Game Theory Models of Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Investments Under Network Vulnerability

Abstract: The effects of cyberattacks are being felt across the globe in multiple sectors and industries. The damages incurred include direct financial damages as well as reputation issues, the loss of business, the inability to provide the expected services, opportunity costs, and the loss of trust. The world economy sustained $400 billion in losses from cyberattacks in 2015 alone.

In this talk, I will first describe a predictive analytical multiproduct network economic model of cybercrime in financial services in which the hacked products are perishable in that their "value" deteriorates over time. I will then discuss our research on game theory models for cybersecurity investments and network vulnerability when firms compete and when they cooperate in terms of information sharing. Algorithms and computational results for both classes of models will be presented and discussed and case studies presented in retail, energy, and financial sectors with extensive sensitivity analysis results that demonstrate the benefits of cooperation.

Program Overview

Time Table
Day 1 (Wednesday - November 2)
Time Activities
08:30 - 09:00 Registration & Breakfast
09:00 - 09:15 Opening Remarks by Chair and TPC Chair
09:15 - 10:10 Plenary Speaker 1: George Cybenko
10:10 - 10:40 Break
10:40 - 11:55 Session 1: Network Security
11:55 - 13:20 Lunch
13:20 - 15:00 Session 2: Decision Making for Privacy
15:00 - 15:30 Break
15:30 - 17:10 Session 3: Security Games

Day 2 (Thursday - November 3)
Time Activities
08:30 - 09:00 Registration & Breakfast
09:00 - 10:00 Plenary Speaker 2: Anna Nagurney
10:00 - 10:30 Break
10:30 - 11:45 Session 4: Incentives and Cybersecurity Mechanisms
11:45 - 13:30 Lunch & Poster Session
13:30 - 14:45 Session 5: Security Risks and Investments
14:45 - 15:05 Break
15:05 - 17:25 Special Session and Panel: Validating Models
19:00 Banquet Dinner

Day 3 (Friday - November 4)
Time Activities
08:30 - 09:00 Registration & Breakfast
09:00 - 10:15 Session 6: Information Limitations
10:15 - 10:45 Break
10:45 - 12:00 Session 7: Intrustion and Exfiltration Detection
12:00 - 12:10 Closing Remarks by Chair

Day 1 (November 2)

8:30-9:00
Registration and Breakfast
9:00-9:15
Opening Remarks (Chair, TPC Chair)
9:15-10:10
Plenary Talk 1: George Cybenko
The Future of Game Theory in Security
Security is most definitely an adversarial engagement and so fits under the broad umbrella of situations that can be modeled by game theory. This talk will discuss three types of applications of game theory to real world security problems - forensic, conceptual and prescriptive. After presenting examples of each together with their relative successes and shortcomings, a variety of possible future roles for game theory in security will be proposed and dissected. Audience discussion and participation will be highly encouraged.
10:10-10:40
Break
10:40-11:55
Session 1: Network Security

Chair: Professor Stefan Rass
Deception-based Game Theoretical Approach to Mitigate DoS Attacks
Hayreddin Ceker, Jun Zhuang, Shambhu Upadhyaya, La Quang Duy and Soong Boon Hee
On the Mitigation of Interference Imposed by Intruders in Passive RFID Networks
Eirini Eleni Tsiropoulou, John Baras, Symeon Papavassiliou and Gang Qu
Resilience of Routing in Paralel Link Networks
Eitan Altman, Aniruddha Singhal, Corinne Touati and Jie Li
11:55-13:20
Lunch
13:20-15:00
Session 2: Decision Making for Privacy

Chair: Professor Tamer Başar
Scalar Quadratic-Gaussian Soft Watermarking Games
M. Kivanc Mihcak, Emrah Akyol, Tamer Başar and Cedric Langbort
On the adoption of privacy-enhancing technologies
Tristan Caulfield, Christos Ioannidis and David Pym
FlipLeakage: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Protect Against Stealthy Attackers in the Presence of Information Leakage
Sadegh Farhang and Jens Grossklags
Strategies for voter-initiated election audits
Chris Culnane and Vanessa Teague
15:00-15:30
Break
15:30-17:10
Session 3: Security Games

Chair: Professor Jun Zhuang
A game-theoretic approach to respond to attacker lateral movement
Mohammad A. Noureddine, Ahmed Fawaz, William H. Sanders and Tamer Başar
Combining Graph Contraction and Strategy Generation for Green Security Games
Anjon Basak, Fei Fang, Thanh Nguyen and Christopher Kiekintveld
Divide to Defend: Collusive Security Games
Shahrzad Gholami, Bryan Wilder, Matthew Brown, Dana Thomas, Nicole Sintov and Milind Tambe
GADAPT: A Sequential Game-Theoretic Framework for Designing Defense-in-Depth Strategies against Advanced Persistent Threats
Stefan Rass and Quanyan Zhu

Day 2 (November 3)

8:30-9:00
Registration and Breakfast
9:00-10:00
Plenary Talk 2: Anna Nagurney
Game Theory Models of Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Investments Under Network Vulnerability

The effects of cyberattacks are being felt across the globe in multiple sectors and industries. The damages incurred include direct financial damages as well as reputation issues, the loss of business, the inability to provide the expected services, opportunity costs, and the loss of trust. The world economy sustained $400 billion in losses from cyberattacks in 2015 alone.

In this talk, I will first describe a predictive analytical multiproduct network economic model of cybercrime in financial services in which the hacked products are perishable in that their "value" deteriorates over time. I will then discuss our research on game theory models for cybersecurity investments and network vulnerability when firms compete and when they cooperate in terms of information sharing. Algorithms and computational results for both classes of models will be presented and discussed and case studies presented in retail, energy, and financial sectors with extensive sensitivity analysis results that demonstrate the benefits of cooperation.

10:00-10:30
Break
10:30-11:45
Session 4: Incentives and Cybersecurity Mechanisms

Chair: Professor Jean Leneutre
Becoming Cybercriminals: Incentives in Networks with Interdependent Security
Aron Laszka and Galina Schwartz
A logic for the compliance budge
Gabrielle Anderson, Guy McCusker and David Pym
Optimal Contract Design under Asymmetric Information for Cloud-Enabled Internet of Controlled Things
Juntao Chen and Quanyan Zhu
11:45-13:30
Lunch and Poster Session
13:30-14:45
Session 5: Security Risks and Investments

Chair: Professor David Pym
Risk Averse Stackelberg Security Games with Quantal Response
Chicoisne Renaud and Fernando Ordonez
Optimal and Game-Theoretic Deployment of Security Investments in Interdependent Assets
Ashish R. Hota, Abraham A. Clements, Shreyas Sundaram and Saurabh Bagchi
Dynamics on Linear Influence Network Games under Stochastic Environments
Zhengyuan Zhou, Nicholas Bambos and Peter Glynn
14:45-15:05
Break
15:05-17:25
Special Session and Panel

Chair: Professor Milind Tambe
Optimal Allocation of Police Patrol Resources Using a Continuous-Time Crime Model
Ayan Mukhopadhyay, Chao Zhang, Milind Tambe, Kenneth Pence, Paul Speer and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
Patrolling a Pipeline
Steve Alpern, Thomas Lidbetter, Alec Morton and Katerina Papadaki
A Methodology to Apply a Game Theoretic Model of Security Risks Interdependencies Between ICT and Electric Infrastructures
Ziad Ismail, Jean Leneutre, David Bateman and Lin Chen
Panel Discussion - Panelists Include:
  • Capt. Tom Morkan (US Coast Guard)
  • CDR Brian Murphy (US Coast Guard)
  • Nathaniel Gleicer (Illumio; Former Director for Cybersecurity Policy for the Nationa Security Council)
  • Dr. Pratyusa Manhadatta (HP Labs)
  • Ron Sartini (Transportation Security Administration)
19:00
Conference Dinner

Day 3 (November 4)

8:30-9:00
Registration and Breakfast
9:00-10:15
Session 6: Information Limitations

Chair: Dr. Riccardo Lazzeretti
A Point-Based Approximate Algorithm for One-Sided Partially Observable Pursuit-Evasion Games
Karel Horák and Branislav Bošanský
Network elicitation in adversarial environment
Marcin Dziubiński, Piotr Sankowski and Qiang Zhang
Optimal Thresholds for Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection in Dynamical Environments
Amin Ghafouri, Waseem Abbas, Aron Laszka, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik and Xenofon Koutsoukos
10:15-10:45
Break
10:45-12:00
Session 7: Intrusion and Exfiltration Detection

Chair: Dr. William Casey
Data Exfiltration Detection and Prevention: Virtually Distributed POMDPs for Practically Safer Networks
Sara Mc Carthy, Arunesh Sinha, Milind Tambe and Pratyusa Manadhata
Consensus Algorithm with Censored Data for Distributed Detection with Corrupted Measurements: A Game-Theoretic Approach
Kassem Kallas, Benedetta Tondi, Riccardo Lazzeretti and Mauro Barni
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Deception over Social Networks Using Fake Avatars
Amin Mohammadi, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Monireh Mohebbi Moghaddam and Quanyan Zhu
12:10
Closing Remarks (Chair)