GameSec 2015

Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security

November 4-5, 2015, London, UK

Technical Program

Time Table
Day 1 (November 4)
Time Activities
08:30 - 09:25 Breakfast & Registration
09:25 - 09:30 Opening Remarks
09:30 - 10:30 Plenary Speaker: Professor Eitan Altman
10:30 - 10:45 Break
10:45 - 12:15 Network Security
12:15 - 13:45 Lunch
13:45 - 15:45 Security of Competitive Environments
15:45 - 16:15 Break
16:15 - 17:45 Short Papers

Day 2 (November 5)
Time Activities
08:30 - 09:30 Breakfast & Registration
09:30 - 10:30 Plenary Speaker: Professor Chris Hankin
10:30 - 10:45 Break
10:45 - 12:15 Learning and Behavioral Models for Security
12:15 - 13:45 Lunch
13:45 - 15:45 Decision-Making for Security and Privacy
15:45 - 16:15 Break
16:15 - 17:15 Cloud Security

Day 1 (November 4)

08:30 - 09:25
Breakfast & Registration
09:25 - 09:30
Opening Remarks
09:30 - 10:30
Plenary Speaker: Professor Eitan Altman
Game theory applied to Protection against SIS Epidemics in Networks
Defining an optimal protection strategy against viruses, spam propagation or any other kind of contamination process is an important feature for designing new networks and architectures. In this work, we consider decentralized optimal protection strategies when a virus is propagating over a network through a SIS epidemic process. We assume that each node in the network can fully protect itself from infection at a constant cost, or the node can use recovery software, once it is infected. We model our system using a congestion game theoretic framework (due to Rosenthal) and find pure, mixed equilibria, and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) in several network topologies. We finally propose extensions of both the SIS propagation model as well as of the protection strategies and evaluate their performance. This work was done within the CONGAS European project on games in complex systems with the authors Stojan Trajanovski, Yezekael Hayel, Huijuan Wang and Piet Van Mieghem.
10:30 - 10:45
Break
10:45 - 12:15
Network Security
A Game-Theoretic Approach to IP Address Randomization in Decoy-Based Cyber Defense
Andrew Clark, Kun Sun, Linda Bushnell and Radha Poovendran
Attack-Aware Cyber Insurance for Risk Sharing in Computer Networks
Yezekael Hayel and Quanyan Zhu
Beware the Soothsayer: From Attack Prediction Accuracy to Predictive Reliability in Security Games
Benjamin Ford, Thanh Nguyen, Milind Tambe, Nicole Sintov and Francesco Delle Fave
12:15 - 13:45
Lunch
13:45 - 15:45
Security of Competitive Environments
Games of Timing for Security in Dynamic Environments
Benjamin Johnson, Aron Laszka and Jens Grossklags
Threshold FlipThem: When the winner does not need to take all
David Leslie, Chris Sherfield and Nigel Smart
A Game Theoretic Model for Defending Against Stealthy Attacks with Limited Resources
Ming Zhang, Zizhan Zheng and Ness B. Shroff
Passivity-Based Distributed Strategies for Stochastic Stackelberg Security Games
Phillip Lee, Andrew Clark, Basel Alomair, Linda Bushnell and Radha Poovendran
15:45 - 16:15
Break
16:15 - 17:45
Short papers
Genetic Approximations for the Failure-Free Security Games
Aleksandr Lenin, Jan Willemson and Anton Charnamord
To Trust or Not: A Security Signaling Game between Service Provider and Client
Monireh Mohebbi Moghadam, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei and Quanyan Zhu
Game Theory and Security: Recent History and Future Directions
Jonathan Merlevede and Tom Holvoet
Uncertainty in Games: Using Probability-Distributions as Payoffs
Stefan Rass, Sandra Koenig and Stefan Schauer
Incentive Schemes For Privacy-Sensitive Consumers
Chong Huang, Lalitha Sankar and Anand Sarwate

Day 2 (November 5)

08:30 - 09:30
Breakfast & Registration
09:30 - 10:30
Plenary Speaker: Professor Chris Hankin
Games and Cyber Security Investment
When investing in cyber security resources, information security managers have to follow effective decision-making strategies. We have investigated a number of methodologies to address this challenge from pure game theory through to a hybrid approach using classical optimisation techniques with game theory. We have constructed tools to support this work and conducted a major case study. The lecture will report on our latest findings from this work.
10:30 - 10:45
Break
10:45 - 12:15
Learning and Behavioral Models for Security
Combining Online Learning and Equilibrium Computation in Security Games
Richard Klíma, Viliam Lisy and Christopher Kiekintveld
Interdependent Security Games under Behavioral Probability Weighting
Ashish Hota and Shreyas Sundaram
Making the most of Our Regrets: Regret-based Solutions to Handle Payoff Uncertainty and Elicitation in Green Security Games
Thanh Nguyen, Francesco Maria Delle Fave, Debarun Kar, Aravind Srinivas Lakshminarayanan, Amulya Yadav, Milind Tambe, Noa Agmon, Andrew J. Plumptre, Margaret Driciru, Fred Wanyama and Aggrey Rwetsiba
12:15 - 13:45
Lunch
13:45 - 15:45
Decision-Making for Security and Privacy
A Security Game Model for Environment Protection in the Presence of an Alarm System
Nicola Basilico, Giuseppe De Nittis and Nicola Gatti
Determining a Discrete Set of Site-Constrained Privacy Options for Users in Social Networks through Stackelberg Games
Sarah Rajtmajer, Christopher Griffin and Anna Squicciarini
Approximate Solutions for Attack Graph Games with Imperfect Information
Karel Durkota, Viliam Lisy, Branislav Bosansky and Christopher Kiekintveld
When the Winning Move is Not to Play: Games of Deterrence in Cyber Security
Chad Heitzenrater, Greg Taylor and Andrew Simpson
15:45 - 16:15
Break
16:15 - 17:15
Cloud security
Sequentially Composable Rational Proofs
Matteo Campanelli and Rosario Gennaro
Flip the Cloud: Cyber-Physical Signaling Games in the Presence of Advanced Persistent Threats
Jeffrey Pawlick, Sadegh Farhang and Quanyan Zhu

*The time slot for each full paper presentation will be 25 min + 5 min discussion, and for each short paper will be 15 min + 5 min discussion.